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ABSTRACT 
 
The study investigates the relationship between auditing services provided to 213 listed firms over a 
period from 1996 to 2000 by reputable (or tier 1) and non-reputable (non-tier 1) audit firms and the 
initial returns at listing. We use market adjusted initial return to reflect the firm’s choice of auditor 
during the initial public offering (IPO’s). The findings show that there is an inclination for listed 
firms to engage tier 1 audit firms, probably due to management’s intention of signal the firm’s 
favorable private information and credibility and integrity of reported financial information and 
ultimately increasing their chances of getting listed. The findings alos show that there is no 
significant difference in the initial returns of IPO’s firms irrespective of the reputation of auditors. 
However, there is a significant difference in the initial return of main and second board firms at 
listing whether firms are either audited by Tier 1 or non-Tier 1 audit firms. Firms that had upward 
switch showed higher returns, inconsistent with the auditor reputation hypothesis. This results, 
however, could be biased by the large number of new firms that did not switch auditors at listing, 
probably due to lack of time to make changes before listing, and/or have engaged tier 1 auditors at 
incorporation in anticipation of listing. However, the findings showed significant higher returns for 
second board firms relative to main board firms. These results do not support the widely held view 
that firms that seek listing do switch auditors prior to their listing for positive market signalling. The 
results indicate that auditor’s reputation is not an important determinant of the IPO’s initial return.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
he change of auditors prior to listing has been an issue of interest among academics, investors, and 
firms management in developed economies due to its effect on under pricing or overpricing of the new 
issue. It is a statutory requirement in Malaysia for every individual company that goes public to engage 
the services of merchant banks to help them get listed. In the process, the companies are required to provide 
prospectus audited by independent auditors to verify the true and fair value of the company. The prospectus normally 
contains information on assets, historical profitability, economic prospects, investment plans and some form of 
forecast profits and dividends. The entrepreneurs usually disclose favorable private information about the firm to the 
potential investors so as to enhance marketability of the offering with good premium. To add more credibility to the 
basic information provided in the prospectus the management of the firm engages the service of reputable auditor. The 
reputational standing of the accountants and auditors is potentially a signalling device for conveying the credibility of 
the information that could be much relied on by the potential investors, as they might not have any other resources to 
verify the information provided by the listing firm. It may also reduce uncertainty and therefore the level of premiums 
on the new listings, as investors might be willing to pay a higher offer price for the shares offered. Choice of quality 
differentiated audit firm might provide a useful setting to ascertain whether potential investors perceive the auditor 
change as a signal of level of uncertainty in the new issue.  
 
Though the information contained in the prospectus gives potentially useful information to prospective 
investors there is also a great uncertainty surrounding the pricing of IPO due to limited disclosures practice among the 
Malaysian companies prior to the listing. In view of the concern about the inherent risks associated with rapid 
expansion of business activities being financed by the proceeds from the new issue, IPO‟s represent a classic example 
of information asymmetries between the pre-issue owners (the „entrepreneurs‟) and the investing public. 
T 
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Entrepreneurs have detailed information on the IPO‟s companies and its true worth whereas potential investors have 
limited knowledge of the business and its future economic prospects. Thus independent auditors will serve as 
signaling device in validating   entrepreneurs‟ claims on private information about the value of the firm to potential 
stockholders. However, there is no documentation on this important issue in this developing Malaysian new issue 
market.  
 
Auditor switch prior to the company going public is fairly common and widely alleged as management‟s 
effort to seek reputable auditors to reduce uncertainty in developed market. Carpenter and Strawser (1971) explained 
this phenomena as necessary to sell their offering at the highest possible price. This widely held view suggests that the 
employment of a reputable audit firm will increase the offer price of the new issue and investors accept lower returns 
in exchange for greater certainty.  
 
There is ample evidence on under-pricing of the firm‟s equity securities (Rock, 1986; Beatty and Ritter, 
1986; Balvers, Mcdonald and Miller, 1988; and Allen and Faulhaber, 1989). And various explanations have been 
offered for the underpricing: for example, Baron (1982) proposed that the investment banker is „better informed‟ than 
the issuing company as to the demand of issuing company‟s securities and therefore underprice to ensure success of 
the issue; Rock (1986) and Beatty and Ritter (1986) proposed that two classes of IPO investors, „informed‟ and 
„uninformed‟ investors are assumed to exist, and underpricing is to entice the informed investors to participate. These 
explanations imply that there is a positive relationship between ex ante uncertainty and the underpricing (initial return) 
of the IPO. 
 
With regard to choice of auditors at the time of listing, Simunic and Stein (1987) suggest that auditor product 
differentiation on the dimensions of control, credibility, and product line motivates management‟s auditor choice in 
IPO market. The form of the underwriter agreement, the proportion of common stocks held by outsiders after the IPO, 
and a measure of uncertainty are related to the choice of auditing firm. Beatty (1989) provides evidence consistent 
with Simunic and Stein (1987) that larger and less risky IPO clients tend to hire Big Eight auditing firms. 
 
Titman and Trueman (1986) suggests that auditor quality provides useful information to investors in 
assessing the value of the IPO firm. Two features of their model lead to signaling of the IPO firm‟s value. First, high 
quality auditors (or investment bankers) are those individuals with a comparative advantage in establishing the 
reported information variable that is related to the firm value. Second, the firm is required to pay a „price premium‟ 
for this higher quality audit. These two expected costs of hiring the high quality auditor exceed the expected benefits 
of misclassification for the low firm value IPO‟s. The cost-benefit relationship leads the entrepreneur to choose an 
audit firm that „signals‟ firm value to the market.  
 
In view of the importance of the auditors‟ choice at listing, this paper address the issue of the effect of choice 
of quality differentiated audit firms on IPO premiums of listed firms in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. More 
specifically, the hypothesized relationship between the choice of quality-differentiated audit and the initial return 
(market premium) of the initial public offers is examined. 
 
The findings have important implications for corporate management decisions, the auditing profession, 
investment adviser/banker and investors in general. The documentation of the various auditor choice and auditor 
switch and the effect on the initial return (market premium) on initial public offerings will assist the corporate 
decision makers to signal news to potential investors before the listing. The findings would also provide information 
to the audit profession regarding public‟s perception on the quality and differentiation of quality of audit services. 
Investment adviser/banker would benefit from the understanding of choice of auditor as a signal of investment 
adviser/banker reputation and the pricing strategy of the new issues. Finally, the investing public could use this market 
signal in formulating price expectation of the new issues. 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
 
The theory of the firm as amended to include agency problem emphasizes the importance of auditing as a 
monitoring device (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) to validate the management‟s claim about the true and fair view of the 
Journal of Business Case Studies – Fourth Quarter 2006                                                              Volume 2, Number 4 
 75 
company to the potential investors who have very limited access to the company‟s private information. DeAngelo 
(1981‟s; 1981b) developed a demand and supply rational for audit quality. Audit quality is defined as the probability 
that an auditor will both discover the breach of contract (management and investing public) and subsequently report it. 
An analogy from product differentiation hypothesis is that firms use auditor choice as a signaling device to reveal 
firm‟s desirable characteristic. Firms appear to signal ex-ante uncertainty by engaging the services of a reputable audit 
firm. This signal is credible to the market since the auditor‟s compensation is higher exhibiting firm-specific 
reputation capital. Firms with favorable information would prefer the services of highly reputed auditors to reduce 
uncertainty. A switch to higher prestige audit firm can enhance audit services because of superior industry 
understanding and hence reduce uncertainty. Management may seek a reputable auditor in an attempt to install a better 
monitoring system and enhance the principals‟ faith in the financial reporting system. This would also portray to the 
potential shareholders the management‟s integrity and good stewardship of shareholders. It is widely perceived that 
higher prestige firm have greater incentive not to perform low quality audit (De Angelo, 1981) 
 
It is well documented in the literature that some companies replace their auditors before going public, for 
reasons of prestige, reputation and greater technical ability (Carpenter and Strawser, 1971). It is also a common 
practice among Malaysia firms to employ more reputable auditors before listing.  The AICPA (1978) and Lurie (1977) 
examined the various reasons for auditor switch and found that the larger and better-known audit firms were believed 
to encourage the sales of their shares. Francis and Wilson (1988) also documented that firms may change to higher 
prestige audit firms (Big-Eight) to increase marketability of the shares.  
 
Unlike the corporate announcement of ex-post events such as earnings, dividends, etc., which reflect real 
change in corporate performance about expected future prospect of a company, auditor change is an event that convey 
no direct apparent economic information. Rather, the possible economic effect from such event is the signals 
associated with different interpretation about the quality of auditor switch by the investors at large (Hagigi et al., 
1993). 
 
De Angelo (1981a) found that financial statement users do not directly observe the audit procedure and have 
only limited information about the auditor contractual arrangement. However, financial statement users develop 
observable proxies, which are associated with audit quality. DeAngelo (1981b) argues that larger firms have greater 
incentive to supply high quality audit services to maintain market capital. It is also asserts that size of the audit firm 
signals audit quality, since larger firm have more clients and accordingly, more future quasi-rents will be lost if the 
auditor‟s reputation is tarnished. Dopuch and Simunic (1982) assert that larger audit firms have differentiated 
themselves from other audit firms in terms of higher audit quality. The assertion on size and quality of audit firms 
suggests that larger audit firms deliver higher quality audits and are less likely to accede to client‟s pressure regarding 
the use of questionable accounting policies and practices. This is designed to build confidence on the financial 
statement from the auditors. If the company with favorable private information chooses to engage higher prestige 
audit firm, the market should react favorably when company had such an upward switch. However, a switch to a 
lower prestige firm (non-Tier 1) is viewed negatively due to the shifting signals of lesser quality standard (Hagigi et 
al., 1993; Johnson and Lys, 1990). Therefore, the market would probably respond positively to the former and 
negatively to the latter moves. 
 
From the agency perspective, a company‟s audited financial statements provide a means for owners to 
monitor the performance of the firm‟s manager. Financial statements that are certified by independent professional 
auditors provide assurance about reliability and credibility. Wallace (1980) suggests that increased credibility of 
financial statements certified by credible auditors reduce investors‟ uncertainty about the reliability of the content of 
financial statements. This suggests that the price effect on shares from auditor switch actually is a proxy for the 
quality of information under strict professional application of standards of a robust accounting environment. Thus, 
financial statements attested by a credible auditor provide an attestation about the quality of information certified by 
accounting profession to investors. In contrast, financial statements that are audited by smaller audit firms, which are 
less reputable may not reduce investors‟ uncertainty about the well being of a company. Hence, a costly search by 
investors to evaluate the true and fair value of the company is perpetrated in such situations. Accordingly, market 
participants may lower the price they are willing to pay for the securities of such firms that switch to lower quality 
auditors. 
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There are also conflicting opinions in some studies. In contrary to the above arguments, some of earlier 
studies argued that professional standard imply homogeneity across different size of audit firms such that audit quality 
is independent of audit firm size. It is further argued that audit quality is relatively homogeneous across audit firms 
assuming all audit firms adhere to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAPs) and Generally Accepted 
Auditing Standard (GAASs). Arnett and Danos (1979) viewed that size alone should not be a prime determinant of 
audit quality. As long as professional standards and qualifications are maintained, it would be unfair to arbitrarily 
distinguish between more or less prestige audit firms. However, Dopuch and Simunic (1982) argue that that credibility 
must be associated with an observable characteristic, such as brand name. Since the detailed information of various 
audit firms are not publicly disclosed, auditors need not be perceived as homogeneous in the quality of their services. 
Such an attribute is difficult and costly to develop as well as maintain, thus it must have market value. Therefore, 
market for auditors should be characterized by product differentiation. In other words, there is heterogeneity among 
the audit firms. From the observed two-tier audit industry structure, Dopuch and Simunic (1982) inferred that higher 
prestige audit firm is more credible than the others. 
 
DATA AND ANALYSIS 
 
Data 
 
This study covers 213 newly listed firms for the period 1996 to 2000. The information on offer price and the 
traded price of these firms was extracted from Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) records, the IPO companies‟ 
prospectus and annual reports. For information prior to listing on sampled firms was obtained from the Registry of 
Companies (ROC). The Composite index proxies the market portfolio and the values of the index was extracted from 
daily diary of KLSE. 
 
To determine impact of auditor switch prior to going public, the choice of auditors at the time of listing was 
examined. Auditor changes that occurred more than two financial periods prior to the IPO was not considered as the 
effect of such changes is remote to have any significant impact on the IPO‟s‟ initial return. 
 
Analysis 
 
To determine the price impact of various auditor switches, the audit firms are categorized into two categories, the 
„Big Eight‟ (and subsequently „Big Five‟) as Tier 1 audit firms and Non Tier 1 audit firms. Tier 1 firms are used here 
to proxy higher prestige audit firm with greater reputational capital, whereas the Non-tier 1 firms‟ proxy the less 
prestige audit firms with lesser reputational capital. To analyze the impact of auditor switch during IPO, the data on 
auditors is sorted into six groups in two different categories: 
 
a. IPO with auditor switch 
 
 Switch from non-tier 1 audit firm to tier 1 audit firm – upward switch. 
 Switch from tier1 audit firm to non-tier 1 audit firm – downward switch. 
 Switch from tier 1 audit firm to another tier 1 audit firm – lateral switch. 
 Switch from non-tier 1 audit firm to another non-tier 1 audit firm – lateral switch. 
 
b. IPO with no auditor switch 
 
 Remain with the same tier 1 auditor 
 Remain with the same non tier 1 auditor 
 The IPO with no auditor switch serves as the control group. 
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The initial return for a firm going public is defined as the first day gross return to an investor who acquire a 
share and sells at the closing price on the first day of public trading.  The initial return in percentage could be 
computed by: 
 
                                       P MC  -  P IPO 
Initial Return (IR)  =   -------------------- X 100% 
   P IPO 
 
Where P MC:  Market price at the close of first trading day, and P IPO:  IPO‟s offer price. 
 
The return on the market portfolio is computed for the identical time period for each IPO. The market return 
in percentage is defined as: 
 
   KLCIMC  -  KLCIP 
Market Return (MR)  =  --------------------------- X 100% 
           KLCIP 
 
Where KLCIMC:  Kuala Lumpur Composite Index at the close of first trading day, and KLCIP: Kuala Lumpur 
Composite Index at the close of the previous trading day. 
 
The Market Adjusted Initial Return (MAIR) is estimated for all categories of switch sample and is defined as 
the difference the initial return on the new issue and the return on the market, that is, MAIR  = IR  - MR. The average 
market adjusted initial return (AMAIR) for each group is computed. Mathematically, it could be expressed as: 
 
        MAIRi 
AMAIRg =   ---------- 
             Ng 
 
Where AMAIRg  = average market adjusted initial return of respective groups, MAIRi = market adjusted initial return 
of IPO firm, and Ng = number of firms in each of the groups. 
 
It is hypothesized that the IPO‟s audited by the tier 1 auditor signals lesser ex ante uncertainty than IPO‟s 
audited by non-tier 1 auditor, thus earning lower average initial returns (AIR), 
 
AIR (Tier 1 Auditors) < AIR (Non Tier 1 Auditors) 
 
Similarly, IPO‟s with downward auditor switch (i.e. switch from tier 1 auditor to non-tier 1 auditor) resulting 
an increases the ex ante uncertainty, thus earning a higher initial returns. 
 
AIR (Downward Switch) > AIR (Tier 1 No Switch) 
 
However, for the price effect of IPO‟s with lateral auditor switches (i.e. tier 1 auditor switch to another tier 1 
auditor or non-tier 1 auditor switch to another Non Tier 1 auditor) is more ambiguous, and a mix signal is expected. 
However, the initial returns of IPO with non-tier 1 lateral auditor switch are expected to generate higher initial returns 
than the IPO with tier 1 lateral auditor switch. This could be expressed as: 
 
AIR (Non Tier 1 lateral switch) > AIR (Tier 1 lateral switch) 
 
The student-t statistics are used to test the statistical significance of the findings. 
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FINDINGS 
 
IPO’s – Board Of Listing And Auditor Choice 
 
A summary of the sample of main and second board firms and their auditor classifications is presented in 
Table 1. The sample consists of 213 initial public offerings with 75 Main Board and 138 Second Board firms. Fifty-
seven (76%) of the main board firms and 78 (56%) of the second board firms were audited by tier 1 auditors. Non-tier 
1 auditor firms audited the remaining of the sample. This implies the dominance of tier 1 auditor firms for main board 
firms and a little more than half of the second board firms. 
 
The bias towards choice of Tier 1 auditors indicates the management‟s preference to signal the companies‟ 
credibility, integrity, reliability of the published information and responsibility towards potential investors. The main 
board IPO‟s is expected to employ the services of tier 1 auditors to sustain their reputation as larger, more established 
and less risky firms. Tier 1 auditors‟ are perceived to be more stringent in providing better quality audit and hence 
reduce uncertainty. 
 
 
Table 1: Sampled Main Board And Second Board IPO’s And Their Auditor Choice 
 Auditors Classification  
Listing Board Tier 1 Auditors Non Tier 1 Auditors Combined 
(Tier1 and Non Tier 1) 
 Number % Number % Number % 
Main Board 57 26.8 18 8.4 75 35.2 
Second Board 78 36.6 60 28.2 138 64.8 
Combined (Main and Second Board) 135 63.4 78 36.6 213 100.0 
 
 
Auditor Choice And Initial Returns 
 
Table 2 shows initial return of main board and second board firms audited by both Tier1 and Non-Tier1 
auditors. 
  
Table 2 : Auditors Choice And IPO’s’ Initial Return 
 Auditors Classification 
 
Listing Board 
Tier 1 Auditors Non Tier 1 Auditors 
Mean Return 
(%) 
Std Dev. (%) Mean Return 
(%) 
Std Dev. (%) 
Main Board 95.69 97.76 76.27 54.71 
Second Board 133.09 119.58 151.37 108.40 
Combined  (Main and Second Board) 117.30 112.05 134.04 103.34 
 
 
Initial return for overall IPO‟s sample audited by tier 1  and  non-tier 1 auditors are 117.30% and 134.04% 
respectively.  However, there is no significant difference (p = 0.293) between these initial returns, implying no price 
effect of auditor choice (tier 1 or non tier 1) decision during listing. Similarly, there are no significant differences (p > 
.10) between initial returns of main board firms audited by either Tier1 or non-tier 1audit firms. Similar results are 
observed for second board firms.  
 
For firms audited by tier 1 auditors only, there is a significant difference (at 5% level) in initial returns (t = 
1.996) between main and second board firms. Similarly, for firms audited by non-tier 1 audit firms only, there is a 
significant difference (at 1% level) between initial returns (t = 3.94) of main and second board firms. 
 
These findings are consistent with the product differentiated hypothesis proposed by DeAngelo (1981a; 
1981b). The Tier 1 auditors are perceived to provide higher quality audit service that reduces the IPO‟s ex ante 
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uncertainty than Non-Tier1 audit firms and hence resulting in lower initial returns. Despite the observed audit firm‟s 
reputational effect on the initial returns, the lower returns of main board firms might also be attributable to the 
perceived lower risk compared to second board firms which are less stable and more volatile. 
 
IPO’s And Auditor Changes 
 
The distributional characteristics of various categories of auditor switch for the newly listed main and second 
board firms for the period from 1996 to 2000 are presented in Table 3.  
 
 
Table 3: Auditors And Their Changes In IPO’s 
Type Of Switches 
Main Board Second Board 
Combined 
(Main and Second 
board) 
No. % No. % No. % 
Tier 1 unchanged (no switch) 56 26.29 60 28.17 116 54.46 
Tier 1 to another Tier 1 (lateral switch) 0 0.00 1 0.47 1 0.47 
Tier 1 to Non Tier 1 (downward switch) 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Non Tier 1 unchanged (no switch) 18 8.45 55 25.82 73 34.27 
Non Tier 1 to another Non Tier 1 (lateral switch) 0 0.00 5 2.35 5 2.35 
Non Tier 1 to Tier 1 (upward switch) 1 0.47 17 7.98 18 8.45 
Total 75 35.21 138 64.79 213 100.00 
 
 
Table 3 shows that only 24 (about 18%) firms did change their auditors at the time of listing, and majority of 
the change (18 out of the 24 firms) were in the upward switch (non-tier 1 to tier 1) category. Seventeen of the upward 
switch firms were from the second board.  
 
Eighty-two percent of the sampled firms did not switch auditors when listing, of which majority is second 
board firms that engaged the services of tier 1 audit firms. The high proportion of no switch firms might be due to a 
combination of the following reasons: 
 
 large numbers of IPO‟s  were incorporated shortly prior to the listing, therefore the choice of auditors had 
been duly considered and was not expected to change within such a short time period. 
 firms that were incorporated for a long time, majority changed their auditors earlier than two financial period 
prior to listing. In the process of complying the capital requirement and profit performance requirements, 
these firms switch their auditors in anticipation of going public three years or five years ahead. 
 
Auditor Switch And Initial Returns 
 
Table 4 summarize the various categories of auditor switch and their respective initial returns. 
 
Table 4: Various Auditors Switches And IPO’s’ Initial Return 
 
Type of Switches 
Main Board Second Board 
Mean Returns 
(%) 
Std Dev. (%) Mean Returns 
(%) 
Std Dev. (%) 
Tier 1 unchanged (no switch) 94.86 98.44 129.15 124.85 
Tier 1 to another Tier 1 (lateral switch) 0 0 70.00 - 
Tier 1 to Non Tier 1 (downward switch) 0 0 0 0 
Non Tier 1 unchanged (no switch) 76.27 54.71 149.58 102.26 
Non Tier 1 to another Non Tier 1 (lateral switch) 0 0 171.00 177.84 
Non Tier 1 to Tier 1 (upward switch) 142.40 - 150.70 103.45 
Total 75 35.21 138 64.79 
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For main board listings, the initial returns for non-switch tier 1 firms are larger (94.86%) than the initial 
returns of non-switch non-tier1firms (76.27%), the difference is not statistically significant. However, the firms in the 
upward switch category recorded 142.40% initial returns. For the second board, the tier 1 non-switch firms generated 
129% initial returns, which are lower than the non-switch non-tier 1 firms‟ returns of 149%; the difference is not 
statistically significant. Firms that had upward switch (from non-tier 1 to tier 1) recorded 150% returns. These 
findings are basically inconsistent with the auditor reputation hypothesis, which postulates that firms audited by 
reputable auditors should have lower initial returns due to less uncertainty. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The study investigates the relationship between auditing services provided to 213 listed firms by reputable 
(or tier 1) and non-reputable (non-tier 1) audit firms and the initial returns at listing. The findings show that there is an 
inclination for listed firms to engage tier 1 audit firms, probably due to management‟s intention of signal the firm‟s 
favorable private information and credibility and integrity of reported financial information and ultimately increasing 
their chances of getting listed. Investment banker‟s and other advisors‟ prefer to engage tier 1 auditors to project a 
better image that could increase the marketability of the issue and reduce the risk of under-subscription.  
 
The findings show that there is no significant difference in the initial returns of IPO‟s firms irrespective of 
the reputation of auditors. However, there is a significant difference in the initial return of main and second board 
firms at listing whether firms are either audited by Tier 1 or non-Tier 1 audit firms. Firms that had upward switch 
showed higher returns, inconsistent with the auditor reputation hypothesis. This results, however, could be biased by 
the large number of new firms that did not switch auditors at listing, probably due to lack of time to make changes 
before listing, and/or have engaged tier 1 auditors at incorporation in anticipation of listing. However, the findings 
showed significant higher returns for second board firms relative to main board firms. These results do not support the 
widely held view that firms that seek listing do switch auditors prior to their listing for positive market signalling. The 
results indicate that auditor‟s reputation is not an important determinant of the IPO‟s initial return. The findings are 
consistent to those documented by Shamsher and Annuar (1997) that investors are indifferent to the quality of audit 
services provided by large and small firms. It is highly probable that investors perceive auditors‟ services as 
homogenous. Other variables such as listing board characteristics play a greater role in determining the level of initial 
returns of initial public offerings.  
 
The findings might be explained by the investors‟ preference for other factors, such as listing board 
characteristics, the company and its business risk, the fundamental factors such as profitability and growth, rather than 
auditor choice and auditor switch as important determinant of initial returns. It is also possible that in the developing 
market like Malaysia, investors‟ awareness of market information and reliance on professional expertise are low, 
financial litigious culture is minimal and corporate governance is still at developing stage. There is limited companies 
disclosure, the market structure itself has minimal reliance on auditor expertise, and therefore its impact on IPO‟s is 
not expected to be significant. 
 
Evidence from a study by Shamsher, Annuar and Ariff (1993) on new issues newly listed within 1975-1989 
suggest that the average initial return in Malaysia on the first trading day is 135%, which is 7.5 times the normal 
return of 18% per annum. This hefty return might lead to investors to believe that IPO is a sure win. In such a 
situation, the auditor role in attesting the accuracy and reliability of financial information in IPO‟s that supposedly 
reduce the IPO‟s ex ante uncertainty might be irrelevant. 
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